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The World in Flux: Keeping Trade Open, Updating the Rules, and Deepening the Singapore–China Bridge

The World in Flux: Keeping Trade Open, Updating the Rules, and Deepening the Singapore–China Bridge

By Zion Zhao Real Estate｜狮家社小赵

At the 16th FutureChina Global Forum, Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Gan Kim Yong offered a clear-eyed map of where the global economy has been and where it must go next. His speech used 35 years of Singapore–China relations to illuminate a broader thesis: openness plus rules delivered prosperity, but the institutions and norms that sustained that order now require reform, flexibility, and renewal. This essay expands on those themes, verifies key facts, and draws on research to explain why a rules-based system must adapt—especially on digital trade, green standards, industrial policy, and frontier tech—if we are to avoid a drift toward fragmentation.




I. 35 Years, Three Projects, and One Evolving Partnership

Singapore and China established diplomatic ties in 1990, just as the Cold War wound down and China accelerated reform-and-opening. DPM Gan’s snapshots are consistent with official data: China has been Singapore’s largest goods trading partner since 2013, and bilateral trade reached ~S$170 billion in 2024 (≈13% of Singapore’s goods trade) (Ministry of Trade & Industry [MTI], 2025). Ministry of Trade and Industry

On investment, Singapore has been China’s largest foreign investor since 2013, a position reaffirmed in Singapore and China government statements and updates through 2025 (MTI, 2023; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2025). Ministry of Trade and Industry+1 These flows are channelled through deep cooperation platforms—Suzhou Industrial Park, Tianjin Eco-City, and the Chongqing Connectivity Initiative—each aligned with evolving Chinese priorities from early industrialization to sustainability and services/logistics. (PRC MFA, 2025). China Foreign Ministry

In April 2023, both countries further elevated ties to an “All-Round High-Quality Future-Oriented Partnership,”signalling intent to deepen cooperation in the digital economy, green transition, and innovation. Subsequent ministerial visits in 2025 reiterated these aims and commemorated the 35th anniversary of diplomatic relations (MFA Singapore, 2025; The Diplomat, 2025). Home+1

II. The Rules-Based Order Worked—Now It Needs Repair and Upgrades

A. What worked: expansion, certainty, and scale

When the World Trade Organization (WTO) launched in 1995 with 76 members, it codified non-discrimination, transparency, and binding dispute settlement, which encouraged governments and firms to plan across borders. Today the WTO counts 166 members, representing ~98% of world trade—a powerful indicator of buy-in, even amid strain (WTO, 2025). (WTO, 2025). World Trade Organization+1

The results were dramatic. Between 1990 and the late 2010s, global GDP roughly tripled (World Bank data series) and more than one billion people exited extreme poverty, with East and South Asia central to that progress (World Bank, 2025). (World Bank, 2025). World Bank Open Data+1 Trade’s distributional gains were never automatic, but at the aggregate level, integration and rules underpinned the greatest poverty reduction in recorded history (World Bank, 2018; 2024/2025 updates). World Bank+1

B. What frayed: adjustment costs, Appellate Body paralysis, and rising protectionism

DPM Gan is also right that interdependence created tension. The “China Shock” literature finds that US regions and industries heavily exposed to import competition from China suffered concentrated job losses—about 2.0–2.4 million jobs between 1999 and 2011, including ~1 million in manufacturing (Autor, Dorn, & Hanson, 2016; Acemoglu et al., 2014). (Autor et al., 2016). NBER+1 Adjustment policies often lagged, amplifying dislocation and political backlash.

Institutionally, the WTO dispute settlement system’s Appellate Body has been paralysed since 2019, weakening enforcement (WTO, 2024; ECIPE, 2024). (WTO, 2024). World Trade Organization+1 Members have tried workarounds like the MPIA (an interim appeal arbitration among willing economies), and others—including the UK in 2025—continue to join (WTO Plurilaterals Info; Reuters, 2025). wtoplurilaterals.info+1 Meanwhile, protectionist measures—tariffs, quotas, export controls, investment screening—have proliferated, with the WTO repeatedly warning about risks to MFN coverage and trade volumes (Reuters, 2025a; 2025b). Reuters+1

C. How to move forward: “flexible multilateralism” + high-quality plurilaterals

Returning to a 1990s-style WTO is unrealistic, but abandoning rules is far worse. The practical answer combines WTO reform with plurilateral pathfinders that are open to accession:

  • WTO Joint Statement Initiatives (JSIs). The JSI on E-commerce reached a stabilised text in July 2024, co-convened by Singapore, Australia, and Japan—a concrete example of flexible multilateralism (MTI, 2024; WTO, 2024). (MTI, 2024). Ministry of Trade and Industry+1 The e-commerce moratorium was also extended at MC13, preserving duty-free treatment for electronic transmissions while talks continue (White & Case, 2024). White & Case LLP

  • Mega-regional FTAs. The CPTPP (now 12 members with the UK) covers ~15% of world GDP and sets high standards on IP, SOEs, labour, and digital (MTI, 2024/2025; Schott, 2024). (MTI, 2025). Ministry of Trade and Industry+1 The RCEP—the world’s largest FTA—spans ~30% of global GDP and population, knitting East Asia’s supply chains and rules of origin (APEC, n.d.). research.apec.org

  • A new “FIT Partnership.” On 16 Sept 2025, 14 small and trade-dependent economies (co-convened by Singapore, New Zealand, Switzerland, UAE) announced the Future of Investment and Trade (FIT) Partnership to work on supply chain resilience, investment facilitation, non-tariff measures, trade facilitation, and technology—explicitly complementing the WTO rather than replacing it (SECO, 2025; Business Times, 2025; bne IntelliNews, 2025). (SECO, 2025). SECO+2Business Times+2

This “open-architecture” approach—WTO core + plurilateral spokes—keeps the system dynamic while avoiding exclusionary blocs. It also aligns with Singapore’s long-standing strategy as a rules-entrepreneur.

III. Updating the Rulebook: Digital, Green, Industrial Policy, Frontier Tech

DPM Gan’s call to “evolve the rules” is timely. Four domains need clearer frameworks:

  1. Digital trade & data governance. Beyond the JSI, Digital Economy Agreements (e.g., DEPA) and CPTPP’s digital chapters offer templates on paperless trade, e-payments, data flows with trust, and interoperable standards. The goal is openness with safeguards—privacy, cybersecurity, and consumer protection—so firms can scale while users remain protected (MTI, 2024; CPTPP resources). Ministry of Trade and Industry+1

  2. Green transition. Convergence on carbon accounting, product standards, and taxonomy for green/transition finance would reduce friction and unlock investment in clean tech supply chains. Plurilateral alignment can mitigate fragmented CBAM-style regimes and prevent a “green spaghetti bowl.” (General WTO/IMF commentary; see also WTO MC13 notes). World Trade Organization

  3. Industrial policy and subsidies. Governments will pursue legitimate objectives (resilience, decarbonization, security). Updated disciplines should preserve space for public interest while curbing beggar-thy-neighbour effects—a balance already debated in OECD/WTO fora (ECIPE, 2024; EU Parliament Brief, 2024). ecipe.org+1

  4. Frontier tech standards (AI, quantum). Voluntary principles and technical standards—interoperable, risk-tiered—can reduce regulatory divergence, enable cross-border R&D, and keep markets contestable without compromising safety. The JSI on e-commerce can anchor digital facilitation while separate AI safety and testing norms evolve in parallel. (WTO/JSI sources). World Trade Organization+1

IV. ASEAN’s Rise, US–China Contestation, and the Case for Middle-Power Leadership

ASEAN remains a growth pole and connector across CPTPP and RCEP. Singapore’s strategy—de-risk, not decouple—recognizes that the US and China together account for over 40% of global GDP; both are indispensable to global demand, finance, and technology diffusion. But contestation has intensified, and tariff cycles risk shrinking MFN coverage and eroding predictability (Reuters, 2025a; 2025b). Reuters+1

In this environment, middle powers can shore up the centre: champion WTO reform, pioneer plurilaterals, and maintain open standards that others can join when ready. Singapore’s role as convener—from JSIs to FIT—is a practical expression of that responsibility (MTI, 2024; SECO, 2025). Ministry of Trade and Industry+1

V. Business China: Bilingual, Bicultural, and Future-Oriented

DPM Gan highlighted Business China’s continuing relevance. Since its launch in 2007 by Lee Kuan Yew and Premier Wen Jiabao, Business China has nurtured bilingual, bicultural talent and helped Singapore firms read China’s policy and market shifts (Business China, n.d.). (Business China, n.d.). Business China As China pivots toward technology, innovation, and green development, those bridges will help enterprises identify new-economy partnerships and co-develop standards.

VI. What Success Looks Like (and How We’ll Know)

  • At the WTO: A restored, credible path to two-tier dispute settlement (whether via Appellate Body reform or a permanent MPIA-like mechanism) and member-driven updates on digital, services, and subsidies disciplines. (WTO, 2024; WTO/JSI trackers). World Trade Organization+1

  • Across plurilaterals: CPTPP expansion with high-standard compliance; RCEP implementation that deepens ROO utilization; and FIT producing tangible pilot outcomes on non-tariff measures and trade facilitation. (MTI, 2024/2025; APEC RCEP brief; SECO, 2025). Ministry of Trade and Industry+2research.apec.org+2

  • For Singapore–China ties: Measurable growth in digital/green project pipelines across the three Government-to-Government platforms and related corridors, alongside continued trade and investment depth (MFA/MTI 2025; CNA, 2025). Home+1

VII. Conclusion: Reform to Preserve

DPM Gan’s core message bears repeating: we cannot turn back the clock, but neither should we drift into a world governed only by power. The task is to reform to preserve—to keep the benefits of openness while modernizing rules for a digital, greener, more contested era. If the WTO can reboot its dispute system and absorb flexible plurilateraloutcomes; if economies can align on digital and green standards; and if bridges like Business China continue to cultivate trust and capability, then the next 35 years can again deliver growth, stability, and opportunity—for Singapore, China, and the world.

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References (APA)

Acemoglu, D., Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G. H., & Price, B. (2014). Import competition and the great U.S. employment sag of the 2000s (NBER Working Paper No. 20395). National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER

APEC Policy Support Unit. (n.d.). Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).https://research.apec.org/rcep/ research.apec.org

Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2016). The China shock: Learning from labor market adjustment to large changes in trade (NBER Working Paper No. 21906). National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER

Business China. (n.d.). About us. https://businesschina.org.sg/about-us/ Business China

ECIPE. (2024, February 26). WTO dispute settlement reform hinges on Washington. European Centre for International Political Economy. https://ecipe.org/ ecipe.org

MTI. (2023, April 1). Press release on CSFTA (Substantive conclusion). Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore. https://www.mti.gov.sg/ Ministry of Trade and Industry

MTI. (2024, July). WTO JSI on E-commerce: Stabilised text announced. Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore. https://www.mti.gov.sg/ Ministry of Trade and Industry

MTI. (2025, Sept 19). Keynote Speech by DPM & Min(T&I) Gan Kim Yong at the FutureChina Global Forum.https://www.mti.gov.sg/ Ministry of Trade and Industry

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2024). CPTPP overview. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/ MFAT

Reuters. (2025, April 3). WTO says tariffs could bring contraction of 1% in global merchandise trade volumes.https://www.reuters.com/ Reuters

Reuters. (2025, Sept 2). Tariffs cause ‘unprecedented’ disruption to global trade rules, WTO chief says.https://www.reuters.com/ Reuters

SECO. (2025, Sept 16). Future for Investment and Trade (FIT) Partnership. State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, Switzerland. https://www.seco.admin.ch/ SECO

The Business Times (Singapore). (2025, Sept 16). Singapore joins 13 countries to launch partnership committed to free trade and enhancing investment flows. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/ Business Times

The Diplomat. (2025, June 25). Singapore, China agree to establish ‘closer ties’ amid global trade uncertainty.https://thediplomat.com/ The Diplomat

White & Case. (2024, March 7). WTO extends e-commerce tariff moratorium as broader negotiations continue.https://www.whitecase.com/ White & Case LLP

WTO. (2024, March 1). MC13 ends with decisions on dispute reform, development; commitment to continue ongoing talks. World Trade Organization. https://www.wto.org/ World Trade Organization

WTO. (2025). Who we are. World Trade Organization. https://www.wto.org/ World Trade Organization

WTO. (n.d.). Members and observers. World Trade Organization. https://www.wto.org/ World Trade Organization

WTO Plurilaterals Info. (n.d.). Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA). https://wtoplurilaterals.info/ wtoplurilaterals.info

WTO Plurilaterals Info. (n.d.). Joint Statement Initiative on E-commerce. https://wtoplurilaterals.info/wtoplurilaterals.info

World Bank. (2018, Sept 19). Decline of global extreme poverty continues but has slowed. https://www.worldbank.org/World Bank

World Bank. (2025, April 7). Poverty overview. https://www.worldbank.org/ World Bank

Notes on verification

  • Trade and investment figures for Singapore–China (largest partner; S$170 billion; 13%) are taken from DPM Gan’s official MTI speech page (Sept 2025) and corroborated by media and PRC MFA sources for the “largest investor since 2013” claim. Ministry of Trade and Industry+1

  • CPTPP and RCEP shares are drawn from MTI and APEC/PSU resources, which are suitable for policy analysis. Ministry of Trade and Industry+1

  • WTO institutional status and membership are sourced from the WTO website, complemented by reporting on MC13 and Appellate Body workarounds. World Trade Organization+2World Trade Organization+2

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