Newport Residences After the 60% ABSD Reset: A Preliminary Data-Driven CBD Freehold Play for the 2026 Waterfront Cycle
Newport Residences After the 60% ABSD Reset: A Preliminary Data-Driven CBD Freehold Play for the 2026 Waterfront Cycle
Author: Zion Zhao Real Estate | 88844623 | WeChat ID: zionzhaosg
When Newport Residences at 80 Anson Road was first whispered about in 2023, it was supposed to be a straightforward “CBD freehold, mixed-use, CDL-grade” story. Then 27 April 2023 happened — the joint property-cooling move that doubled ABSD on foreigners from 30% to 60% and raised tiers for multiple-property buyers. That single midnight change collapsed the original foreign-buyer demand curve for CCR launches and forced sellers, agents and developers to rethink how a prime, freehold CBD project should be positioned (Monetary Authority of Singapore [MAS], 2023; Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore [IRAS], 2025). In fact, condo purchases by foreigners fell about 70% in the 12 months after the hike, with the impact most visible in the CCR, exactly where Newport sits. The market context changed first, then the launch timing followed. The Straits Times+1
What this means is that Newport’s 2025–2026 re-entry is not “late”; it is better timed. It now comes back into a market with (i) clearer CCR benchmarks, thanks to Marina/City launches that have proven there is still depth for well-located, well-designed products, (ii) a more mature narrative around the CBD Incentive Scheme — URA has even refreshed it as CBDI 2.0 in 2025 — and (iii) a much more visible Greater Southern Waterfront (GSW) phasing, with Keppel Club, Pasir Panjang Power District and Mount Faber all publicly identified as early movers (Urban Redevelopment Authority [URA], 2025a; URA, 2019). Urban Redevelopment Authority+2Urban Redevelopment Authority+2
Newport Residences at 80 Anson Road is returning to the market in a stronger position than when it was first slated to launch in 2023. The key shift was Singapore’s April 2023 cooling measures, which raised ABSD on foreigners to 60% and temporarily dampened CCR sentiment. Instead of forcing a launch into weak foreign demand, the developer waited — and now Newport can ride on clearer CCR benchmarks (e.g. Marina/Downtown launches that sold well), a more visible CBD Incentive Scheme, and URA’s advancing Greater Southern Waterfront (GSW) plan, which sits right across from Tanjong Pagar.
The project itself have all the hallmarks of what I call a highly defensible property investment: freehold, CDL-developed, mixed-use, and crucially, all residences start from the 23rd floor, giving every unit an automatic “high-floor baseline”. The unit mix is deliberately compact — mostly 1- and 2-bedders for CBD tenants and investors — with a small number of 3BR, 4BR premium and a single sky penthouse to preserve prestige. Some buyers will still object on three fronts: entry price in the low S$3,000 psf (with some stacks possibly S$4,000 psf), tighter layouts compared to older luxury stock, and the belief that the CBD story is “over”.
In this essay, I aim to show why those objections don’t fully hold. Market evidence already supports S$3,0xx psf for well-located 99-year projects; a freehold, 23F+ CBD product is therefore not out of line. Compact layouts reflect national buyer behaviour, not developer stinginess. And URA has in fact expanded, not retired, its CBD rejuvenation agenda, while GSW will add long-term amenity and value. For investors willing to hold through the 2026–2030 window, Newport offers a rare combination of tenure, height, mixed-use convenience and policy tailwinds — provided buyers rely on final developer pricing and URA-approved plans, and not on speculative figures.
1. Rapid-Fire Project Overview: What Newport Actually Is
Address & Planning Setting: 80 Anson Road, right inside the Tanjong Pagar / Downtown Core belt, within the Anson precinct specifically listed under the CBD Incentive Scheme for conversion of older office stock into mixed-use, people-friendly developments (URA, 2019; URA, 2025a). Urban Redevelopment Authority+1
Developer Pedigree: City Developments Limited (CDL) / Hong Leong group — i.e. an A-list developer with a long track record of high-rise, city-core and integrated projects.
Tenure: Freehold — this matters because post-GSW, future residential land released via GLS along the coast is very likely to be 99-year, meaning existing freehold CBD/near-GSW stock enjoys structural scarcity (URA, 2019). Urban Redevelopment Authority
Format: A true mixed-use retrofit — offices + serviced apartments/flexible stay + private residences. Residential starts from the 23rd floor upwards, so every unit begins from a “high-floor baseline.” That was correctly highlighted in my research materials and is actually a bigger value point than many realise, because you get view clearance without having to buy the absolute top stacks.
TOP / VP Window: Being at 2030, which lines up nicely with the government’s own 5–10 year GSW staging. Buyers are effectively buying ahead of the next waterfront wave, not after it (URA, 2019; URA, 2025b). Urban Redevelopment Authority+2URA Draft Master Plan+2
So even at the overview level, the project sits inside three official policy tailwinds — CBD rejuvenation, GSW coastal city-building, and compact, transit-oriented urban living — all of which are in black-and-white URA circulars, not marketing fantasy (URA, 2019; URA, 2025a).
2. Unit Mix: “Compact but Complete” Is Not a Bug — It’s the 2020s City Format
Unit Mix (as of now):
1BR: ~431–495 sqft
1BR + study: ~581 sqft
2BR / 2BR premium: ~646–926 sqft
3BR / 3BR premium: ~980–1,227 sqft
4BR premium: ~2,000+ sqft
1 super penthouse ~12,960 sqft
This is textbook 2020s CCR: a broad base of one- and two-bedders for CBD tenants and investor-landlords, topped with a very small number of large-family and trophy units to preserve prestige. It is also fully in line with national data — median new non-landed sizes have shrunk 10–30% over the past 10–15 years as developers kept quantum manageable for buyers constrained by TDSR, higher stamp duties and post-2023 interest rates (EdgeProp Singapore, 2023; The Independent Singapore, 2025; The Straits Times, 2025). Smaller units are not a Newport quirk; they are the market. The Straits Times+3River Green, River Valley Green+3EdgeProp+3
And you’re right to say “this development is not harmonised.” That simply means it’s using pre-harmonisation sizes/layout logic — typically a bit tighter, but often more efficient — which many renters actually like because they pay for usable area, not for compliance padding.
3. The Three Big Objections — And What’s Actually Behind Them
In this segment, I will touch on three very common objections my buyers will pose to me. The three real turn-offs are namely:
“Entry price too high”
“Units too compact for luxury”
“CBD story is over / decentralisation more exciting”
Let’s take them seriously and fact-check.
3.1 “Entry Price Too High”
My estimated starting prices in the low S$3,000 psf, with higher floors possibly kissing S$4,000 psf. On the surface, that sounds punchy — until I place it against what the rest of the market is already doing. From 2023 onwards, we saw multiple 99-year city-fringe/near-city launches comfortably printing S$2,8xx–3,6xx psf for good stacks, and that was without being (i) freehold, (ii) above level 23, or (iii) inside a CBDI-backed, mixed-use icon. In other words, the market has already normalised S$3,000+ psf for well-located, well-spec’d products (PropNex, 2024; MAS, 2023). Against that backdrop, “freehold, CBD, 23F+ baseline, CDL” at low-3,000s is not nosebleed — it is consistent. The real issue is not “is 3,0xx psf crazy,” but “is the buyer’s holding period long enough to let the GSW and CBDI 2.0 tailwinds show up?” Short-term flippers will naturally balk. Monetary Authority of Singapore+1
3.2 “Units Too Compact”
I have already debunked this in this essay and a lot of my previous essay, but the data helps: URA and the media have documented a steady drift to smaller primary-market units, driven by affordability and changing household size (The Straits Times, 2025; PLB Insights, 2025). Newport is simply positioning itself where the real rental and resale velocity is — 1- and 2-bedders near MRT and job nodes — while still giving a tiny upper tier of 4BR and a sky penthouse for status-conscious buyers. Also, condo facilities are getting more vertical and more complete, which offsets the smaller private space (URA, 2025a). The Straits Times+1
3.3 “CBD Story Is Over”
This is the easiest myth to kill, because URA literally released CBD Incentive Scheme 2.0 in February 2025 — proof that the government is still pushing for older CBD office to be converted into mixed-use, residential and hotel stock to create a 24/7 downtown (URA, 2025a; URA, 2025c). On top of that, URA’s GSW pages were updated with more precise staging: former Keppel Club, Pasir Panjang Power District and waterfront housing will roll out over the next 5–10 years right across from the CBD edge (URA, 2019; URA, 2025b). A freehold CBD residence that is already topped out when the waterfront starts to bloom is not behind — it is ahead. Urban Redevelopment Authority+2Urban Redevelopment Authority+2
4. The Price Matrix: Why Your “Wishful Thinking” Still Helps Buyers
Please do note that the matrix was purely my own estimate. The actual prices will ultimately come from the developer nearer launch. Still, I believe my matrix serves a useful purpose: it teaches buyers how to think about a project like this.
First filter — floor: because every unit already starts at 23F, vertical premium is real. Sea or GSW-facing high-floor units will logically price at the upper bands.
Second filter — scarcity: 4BR ~2,000+ sqft and the single 12,960-sqft penthouse will command value far in excess of a simple psf model because they are the only stock of that type in the building.
Third filter — tenure/mixed-use adjustment: when comparing to 99-year CBD fringe launches that are already above S$3,000 psf, a 5–10% freehold/mixed-use premium is not irrational, especially when the project is part of an URA-backed CBD rejuvenation corridor (URA, 2025a).
So even though the actual numbers will move, my matrix thinking is solid: start with floor, stack and scarcity, then cross-check against what the rest of the Downtown / Marina has already proven the market can absorb.
5. Debunking the Three Myths — With Policy and Market Proof
Let us just do a deep dive it with my research materials:
“3,0xx psf CBD is outrageous.”
After the April 2023 ABSD hike, the government itself noted that demand would “moderate” but not collapse — and it used stamp duty, not price controls, to cool the market (MAS, 2023). By mid-2024 and 2025 we still saw prime and waterfront products performing when they had the right story and quantum. So, price is not the only determinant; positioning, tenure and timing matter. Monetary Authority of Singapore+1“Compact = inferior.”
Median new-home sizes have fallen from about 1,000 sqft in 2010 to roughly 900 sqft in 2024, a 10%+ drop, because buyers prefer lower quantum, centrality and facility richness (The Independent Singapore, 2025; The Straits Times, 2025). Newport is simply matching an established demand curve. The Independent Singapore News+1“CBD transformation is over.”
URA’s 2025 circular expressly says it is rejuvenating the CBD further to “encourage the conversion of older office developments” into mixed-use, with more residences and lifestyle uses — the exact bucket into which Newport falls (URA, 2025a). At the same time, GSW is moving into visible execution, which will raise the amenity value of the entire south edge of Singapore (URA, 2025b). Urban Redevelopment Authority+2Urban Redevelopment Authority+2
6. So… Why Will People Still Buy Newport?
These are my “three reasons.”:
Reason 1: Scarcity Meets Policy.
Freehold inside the Downtown/Anson belt, already converted under the CBDI framework, and ready before GSW housing becomes a reality — that is a very narrow, very valuable intersection. Future GSW plots will likely be 99-year, so anyone wanting perpetual ownership facing the new waterfront will find very few alternatives (URA, 2019; URA, 2025b). Urban Redevelopment Authority
Reason 2: High-Floor Baseline + Mixed-Use Shield.
Because residences start from level 23, you remove the usual CBD problem of “I paid CCR price for an 8th-floor carpark view.” You also enjoy the bustle of an integrated development (office + serviced apartments) but sleep well above it. That’s a strong owner-occupier and tenant pitch.
Reason 3: Real Rental Depth, Even After 60% ABSD.
Yes, foreigners now pay 60% ABSD, and yes, foreign buying in CCR fell sharply in 2023–2024. But the rental demand for CBD-proximate, small, new, well-managed units never vanished — Singapore is still the regional HQ node for Southeast Asia, and its office + finance base never left (Straits Times, 2024; Financial Times, 2025). If your strategy is yield + long-hold on a freehold CBD asset, you can underwrite that on tenant demand, not on foreign-buyer flip demand. And because there is a hospitality-style services stack, Newport is positioned to command a small premium over vanilla CBD condos. The Straits Times+1
Thank you for reading my Newport Residences analysis. I don’t just sell condos
I study Singapore’s policies, ABSD changes, global geopolitics, interest-rate cycles and even equity/crypto flows daily, then translate them into property strategies you can execute safely. As a Singapore RES, SAF Captain and advisor familiar with Land and Business Law, I help international, China Chinese, SEA and local UHNW/institutional clients structure purchases for living, ้ช่ฏป/็ๅญฆ or family-office needs — prudently and without ่ฟ่ง. If you want a less volatile, Singapore-dollar, income-style asset to balance your portfolio, prime residences like Newport deserve a proper numbers-based review, not rumours. Let me walk you through entry, holding costs, rental yield and exit scenarios so you can decide with clarity. Message me today for a private, data-driven consultation. I will tailor it to your citizenship, financing, family and portfolio objectives, in English or Chinese, with full due diligence and transparent, documented recommendations always.
7. Disclaimers:
All pricing in this Part 1 (preliminary) is indicative/illustrative and not from the developer. Buyers must rely on the final price list, Option to Purchase and Sale & Purchase Agreement.
All planning and policy references (CBDI 2.0, GSW staging, ABSD 60% for foreigners) are drawn from government/official sources current as of 2024–2025 and should be rechecked nearer launch in case of policy changes (MAS, 2023; IRAS, 2025; URA, 2025a).
Nothing here is tax, legal or investment advice; it is educational material to help investors understand the moving parts before part 2 (on a latter date) of my review when I get more information from more developer meetings and actual launch.
Always make clear you are not guaranteeing profits or capital appreciation; Singapore’s regulators and agencies are explicit about avoiding misleading or overstated claims.
References (APA 7th ed.)
EdgeProp Singapore. (2023, August 21). Analysis: The evolution of condo sizes over the years.
Financial Times. (2025, October). What’s behind Singapore’s world-high property transaction costs?
Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore. (2025, June 11). Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty (ABSD).
Monetary Authority of Singapore. (2023, April 26). Measures for a sustainable property market.
PropNex Realty. (2024, May 8). What has changed a year on from the ABSD hike in April 2023? propnex.com
The Independent Singapore. (2025, February 2). Singapore new condos get smaller and smaller as developers try to keep price down. The Independent Singapore News
The Straits Times. (2024, April 28). Condo sales to foreigners down 71% since ABSD hike in April 2023. The Straits Times
The Straits Times. (2025, September 8). Small condo units in Singapore draw steady demand, but are harder to resell. The Straits Times
URA. (2019). Master Plan 2019: Urban transformations — Greater Southern Waterfront. Urban Redevelopment Authority
Urban Redevelopment Authority. (2025a, February). Central Business District (CBD) Incentive Scheme 2.0. Urban Redevelopment Authority+1
Urban Redevelopment Authority. (2025b). Vibrant city living for all — Draft Master Plan 2025 (Central Region). URA Draft Master Plan
Urban Redevelopment Authority. (2025c). Revisions to rejuvenation incentive schemes (CBDI, SDI). Urban Redevelopment Authority
All information above is provided for educational discussion only, is subject to change without notice, and should be verified against the developer’s final documents and the latest government circulars.
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